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Abstract
Background: Examining professional assessments of a blood product recall/withdrawal and its implications for risk
and public health, the paper introduces ideas about perceptions of minimal risk and its management. It also
describes the context of publicly funded blood transfusion in Canada and the withdrawal event that is the basis of
this study.
Methods: Interviews with 45 experts from administration, medicine, blood supply, laboratory services and risk
assessment took place using a multi-level sampling framework in the aftermath of the recall. These experts either
directly dealt with the withdrawal or were involved in the management of the blood supply at the national level.
Data from these interviews were coded in NVivo for analysis and interpretation. Analytically, data were interpreted
to derive typifications to relate interview responses to risk management heuristics.
Results: While all those interviewed agreed on the importance of patient safety, differences in the ways in which
the risk was contextualized and explicated were discerned. Risk was seen in terms of patient safety, liability or
precaution. These different risk logics are illustrated by selected quotations.
Conclusions: Expert assessments did not fully converge and it is possible that these different risk logics and
discourses may affect the risk management process more generally, although not necessarily in a negative way.
Patient safety is not to be compromised but management of blood risk in publicly funded systems may vary. We
suggest ways of managing blood risk using formal and safety case approaches.
Background
Introduction
Blood is a special product, being integral to life and
inside our bodies. As Chan [1] notes (following Titmuss
[2]), there is much symbolism associated with blood. As
a medical solution to a health problem it depends on
the gift of others. Its gift or donation is altruistic and
seen as sharing what is essential to life. In Christian
societies, blood is seen as having the ability to wash
away sins [3]. It represents purity, intensified by its gift
to others. Blood donation is a very visible connection to
others, even in societies where payments are made to
donors [4]. These payments remain controversial and
may lead to compromises in the safety of blood
products. Blood donation is indeed a two-edged sword:
a lifesaver or a transmitter of disease. The struggle over
successful compatibility of blood types and to combat
transmissible diseases has been a long but largely suc-
cessful story [5]. The hazards in receiving transfused
blood were heightened by HIV/AIDS, which as Chan [1]
argues, led to the blood risk being intensified by this
stigmatising illness. But since the mid-1980s, screening
tests for sexually transmitted infections, including HIV
and, later, other transmissible diseases have been imple-
mented in many countries worldwide. In fact, scientific
risk assessments, the vigilance of existing or new federal
agencies, enhanced public information and disclosure
have greatly improved both the calculated and perceived
risk of ‘bad blood’. As we shall see, Canada is no excep-
tion but it is a jurisdiction where there is particular
salience.
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about 0.5 to 3 percent of all transfusions resulting in
adverse consequences [6]. A proportion of these adverse
events result from error in preparation and administra-
tion. Other adverse events are classified as infectious (e.
g. HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, human T-Cell lymphotropic
virus (HTLV), West Nile virus) or non-infectious (these
are commoner and include acute haemolytic reaction,
transfusion associated acute lung injury, allergic reac-
tions, graft-host disease). While severe non-infectious
complications are rare, case fatality is high. Infectious
disease risks associated with blood transfusion in
Canada are currently estimated at 1 per 7.8 million
units transfused for HIV, 1 per 2.3 million for hepatitis
C, and 1 per 153,000 for hepatitis B [7]. For manufac-
tured plasma-derived products, the risk is estimated at
less than 1 in 10 million or theoretical [8]. Bacterial
infection from contaminated blood products is also pos-
sible but routine bacterial screening of high risk pro-
ducts (platelets) and changes in blood collection
techniques have reduced this risk significantly. Methods
to inactivate pathogens in blood products (those cur-
rently known and future threats), have been developed
for plasma and platelets and methods applicable to red
cells are under development. Canadian blood suppliers
are currently exploring the feasibility of implementing
these new technologies once they are available [9]. So
despite public concern (see Lee [10]), experts would
surely see risk as minimal and theoretical. And they do.
B u tt h i sd o e sn o tp r e v e n te v e r y‘unsafe’ blood incident
from being rigorously pursued. But this assumes that all
experts may have the same goals or different pathways
to similar goals which may shape the treatment of the
hazard differently. In part they do - the safety of the
product and public health. But do different groups of
experts have other goals or interpretations which may
shape the treatment of hazard in specific ways? This is
the broad question explored in this paper, the major
contribution of which is to examine the divergence of
expert opinion even where science is consistent and the
goal universal.
A Constructivist View of (Blood) Risk
To answer our question, a constructivist approach is
adopted. Assessing and managing all kinds of risk is a
challenging task but this is especially the case in those
risks pertaining to human health which are largely dealt
with in the public domain. Because these concerns do
invoke public discourse, much attention has been paid
to the differences, if any, between expert and public per-
ceptions and assessments [11]. For twenty years or
more, constructivist analyses have brought to the fore
the importance of prior social, cultural, institutional and
political factors that shape and are embedded in both
lay and expert risk assessments (see [12]). Lay people
and experts use similar cognitive processes with both
falling prey to errors from anchoring, overconfidence
and the gambler’s fallacy (see [13]) Attention has also
turned to the perceptions and assessments of experts
themselves. Van Zwanenberg and Millstone [12] com-
ment that the construction of scientific claims can
inform risk assessments. Furthermore, a “coherent realm
of expertise” may not exist, as Haggerty [14:201] points
out with respect to crime risk. He adds that expert opi-
nion about crime risk is incredibly fractured with there
being differences in professional opinion with respect to
d i m e n s i o n so fh i g h - p r o f i l er i s k sa sw e l la st h en a t u r e
and efficiency of crime prevention. Sjoberg [15] also
points out that there is likely to be a whole range of
expertise and this range is not well-articulated in many
risk perception studies. If, therefore, there is this range
of expertise, why should we expect expert opinions to
converge, although overconfidence in technical and
medical assessments may exist (but see [16])? In fact, we
shall note certain biases in expert opinion.
Shanteau [17] questions the convergence of expert
opinion which is based on the widespread use of statis-
tics and economics in assessments and on the wide-
spread search for generalizability in how people think
about risks. Shanteau argues then that the bases of con-
vergence are in themselves flawed (see also [18-20]). Of
course, it is recognised that different risk logics or dis-
courses - i.e. different conceptions of an activity or
event as risk - exist, but these have seldom been applied
to expert opinion (see [21,22]). Silva et al. [23] show, in
an experimental setting, that despite differences in
scientific background and political beliefs, scientists tend
towards a precautionary stance over the setting of safety
standards. Yet scientists are not the only type of expert
involved in such matters. McMahan et al., [24] point to
the differences in how scientists and risk assessors
regard electric and magnetic fields. Furthermore, Chal-
mers et al. [25] show how the opinions of dentists and
nursing directors vary over dental care in nursing
homes. Chociolko [26] provides an example of expert
disagreement often found in sometimes adversarial set-
tings in which experts ‘take sides’ representing, say,
industry or community.
How might we assess expert opinion and convergence
on risky matters? Shanteau [17] points to the impor-
tance of the level of decision, made by experts using a
medical analogy of diagnosis (what is it?), prognosis
(what is the likely outcome?) and treatment (what to do
about it?), with a different logic applied on different
levels. Furthermore, experts and professionals possess
similar cognitive properties as non-experts. “Experts are
not immune to the cognitive illusions that affect other
people” [27]. And it is increasingly noted that cognition
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[28]). As Cross [29:28] comments: “when an attitude or
an activity is of considerable importance to a person,
the individual is loathe to believe that it is hazardous.”
Furthermore, biases or heuristics found in studies of
perceived risk may be found among experts and affect
their assessments and opinions. In this paper, we
address some of these issues about expert opinions, uti-
lising the ideas of non-convergence (especially at differ-
ent levels of an assessment), and of the heuristics made
by different professional groups (commitment to a parti-
cular practice, reliance on rational models and thinking),
to understand different concepts of risk relating to the
b l o o ds u p p l ya r i s i n gf r o mac a s ew h e ns u p p l yo f‘safe
blood’ was potentially disrupted in one Canadian city.
So all may want ‘safe blood’ but do the management
and decision-making styles and discourses of all actors
converge or vary?
The Context and the Case
’Safe blood’ has been a major policy issue in Canada.
This is also a sensitive issue, which likely arises from
the ‘tainted blood tragedy’ of the 1970s and 1980s. At
that time, the blood supply was organised and managed
by the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) as this body
had been responsible for blood supply during the Sec-
ond World War. CRCS is a not-for-profit, humanitarian
society, with many diverse activities extending beyond
the responsibility for the blood supply which are largely
carried out by volunteers. A chronic lack of funding for
the CRCS held back technical developments to collect
and supply blood in Canada. Government funding only
began to increase in the mid-1970s as procedures for
blood collection became modernised. But its principles
as part of the international Red Cross (non-discrimina-
tion against individuals and independence from govern-
ment) meant its screening and management procedures
became fatally flawed in the Canadian context, with
often strained relations between volunteer oversight and
professional activities. These limitations set the stage for
tragedy with the discovery of blood-borne diseases as
recruitment of donors was still in volunteer hands and
carried out with self-answered questionnaires. The
recipe for disaster was set, and the situation was wor-
sened by the failure to track those who had received
tainted blood and a failure to apologise or compensate
affected individuals on the parts of the provincial and
federal governments (see [30,31]). As Picard [30] has
noted, ‘tainted blood’ was arguably the largest public
health catastrophe in Canada. “About 1,000 individuals
who received blood transfusions in Canada between the
late 1970s and 1980s were infected with HIV and
another 30,000 were infected with hepatitis C” [32].
Eventually, this led to the establishment of a public
inquiry in 1993 with the final report of the Krever Com-
mission being delivered in 1997 [31]. Krever recom-
mended the creation of a new blood system and the
Commission’s recommendations led to the creation of
Canadian Blood Services to operate the system in all
provinces, except Quebec which formed its own agency,
Héma-Québec. With the creation of these agencies, the
Canadian blood system joined the U.S. and West Eur-
opean countries in having an expert-based and scientifi-
cally-based system and CRCS went on to different
humanitarian tasks.
For the blood system and perhaps other aspects of the
Canadian healthcare system, Krever highlighted two key
elements - the institution of precautionary measures and
the creation of a governance system emphasising safety
(see [32]). Risk assessment became based on scientific
tests and evidence and the management system highly
coupled and structured to protect human health. The
Canadian blood system is currently seen as a high relia-
bility organisation, emphasising safety and responsive-
ness to problems [33]. In fact, these elements were
introduced so the Canadian blood system could respond
to threats in a timely and effective way. This was the
case for threats from infectious agents with product
recall or donor deferral being rapidly instituted for var-
iant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (See [33,34]), West Nile
virus (see [35]) and SARS. It is also the case for ‘organi-
sational threats’ in which practice errors over labelling,
documentation, or other deviations from procedures are
dealt with through product withdrawal. For such threats,
it may be said that the Krever report is one dimension
in the increasing use of quality assurance for among
other things patient safety in health care. But we know
from other settings that challenges occur and ‘accidents’
(often resulting from operator error or technical mal-
function) are normal in complex systems [36]. It seems
therefore worth discovering if in this highly coupled,
apparently well-managed system, all experts agree about
the nature of arising hazards.
Recalls involving small numbers of blood products
occur frequently (daily), for example, when donors pro-
vide post-donation information that affects their eligibil-
ity as a blood donor. Whereas withdrawals, which occur
less frequently, are often due to operational deviations
where the risk is minimal or unknown and may involve
a large number of blood products. Withdrawal involving
a large number of blood products can jeopardize the
availability of an adequate blood supply.
When there is a real or perceived threat to the safety
of the blood supply, withdrawals occur without refer-
ence to cost or potential short-term shortages. A major
withdrawal of blood products in Ontario in 2005
involved over 3500 blood product components. The rea-
son for this withdrawal was clerical in nature associated
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time each donor gives blood. The risk to the blood sup-
ply was likely minimal or nonexistent. Individuals in the
appropriate organizations joined forces to deal with the
matter. But it brought to light many of the challenges
faced by both hospitals and the blood suppliers around
dealing with error and emphasized gaps in the system
related to timeliness; communication; risk perception;
and recipient notification. It provides an example of
what we call organizational ‘threat’ or, more positively, a
learning opportunity. We suggest that this approach to
identifying error as a potential for hazard and risk is
useful in that it focuses attention on possible differences
in organizational responses and public notification.
So given the context, it would appear that the case
could have been dealt with procedurally with all parties
- regulators, blood product supplier, hospitals and treat-
ment facilities and agents - being on the same page. The
risk from the blood product should have been seen in a
universal way by all parties involved in this particular
case. But was it? If there are different levels of decision-
making and risk assumptions do expert assessments
necessarily converge? The answer, to anticipate, is yes
and no.
Methods
This paper is an outgrowth of a study undertaken to
determine the current procedures and protocols for
handling the recall/withdrawal of blood products in
Ontario and beyond [37,38]. In this we adopt a quasi-
foundational position, with the experiences and views of
respondents being seen in the answers to our questions
(see Additional File 1: Appendix 1) from which exem-
plars in the form of quotations are drawn (see [39]). We
undertook a number of one-on-one interviews with key
stakeholders in the blood supply and management
arena, both within and beyond Ontario. Interviews were
conducted with individuals from Canadian Blood Ser-
vices, Héma-Québec, Ministry of Health and Long Term
Care (Ontario), relevant staff at hospitals and hospital
laboratories, as well as blood product recipients. These
recipients were not professional or credentialized
experts but it was felt that their experience of the blood
transfusion system might add a different perspective to
our investigation. Within hospitals, we interviewed phy-
sicians (both transfusion medicine physicians and physi-
cians who do not work in the transfusion service but
who use blood products), hospital administrators, CEOs,
risk managers and public relations personnel. Within
hospital laboratories, we interviewed managers, technol-
ogists and transfusion safety officers. In other words, we
interviewed in total 45 professionals involved in blood
supply - regulators, suppliers, treatment individuals and
agencies, administrators, laboratory personnel and
transfusion recipients. The project’s steering committee
(composed of individuals from the blood supplier, hospi-
tals and laboratories) helped to identify individuals from
the blood supply and management arena who had
experience of blood product recalls and withdrawals and
who could therefore be anticipated to be able to provide
rich data. This purposeful sampling was augmented by
asking those individuals interviewed to suggest others
whom they thought it would be helpful to interview. We
employed a multilevel sampling framework in that we
wished to compare the perceptions of those with poten-
tially different stances on blood risk management (see
[40]). We recognise that the sample size in our study
limits the generalisability of our findings and interpreta-
tions, and it may indeed be exploratory with our prac-
tice suggestions being essentially that–suggestive.
Table 1 shows the number of participants interviewed
within each category. As well as interviews, copies of
written relevant rules and procedures pertaining to
recalls/withdrawals were obtained. And we may ask -
does opinion converge on the type and nature of the
risk?
We also planned to conduct interviews with individuals
from the Ontario Hospital Association and from Health
Canada (the regulator of the Canadian blood system). It
became clear while talking to individuals from the
Ontario Hospital Association that the association does
not currently play a role in blood product recalls/with-
drawals within the province. Health Canada, despite
being asked on several occasions, declined to participate
in the project, having been advised by their legal depart-
ment not to do so in order to avoid the possibility of
liability issues.
Table 1 Job categories of respondents in blood risk
study
Category # Job title # of participants
interviewed
1 Laboratory Manager 3
2 Transfusion Safety Officer 2
3 Lab Technologist (Blood Bank) 9
4 Physicians - Blood Bank 4
5 Physicians - who use blood products 7
6 Hospital Administration 4
7 Hospital PR 1
8 Hospital Risk Management 2
9 Blood Suppliers (CBS, Hema-Quebec) 9
11 MoH (Provincial) 2
13 Recipients of blood products 2
11 Total 45
Note: Numbers in the text after job title refer to individuals in that category
interviewed.
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as possible of the recall/withdrawal process across the
province of Ontario, we made sure that the different
types of hospitals were represented (large urban teach-
ing hospitals, smaller urban hospitals and rural hospi-
tals). We also interviewed individuals from Héma-
Québec, to get a sense of how the process compares
between blood suppliers and key informants from other
provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and
Saskatchewan).
The protocol was approved by the Research Ethics
Board of McMaster University. The interview guide
included questions on understanding the terminology
involved in recall/withdrawal situations; individuals’
experiences of these situations and the actions taken
by different individuals and or stakeholders at different
stages in the process; existing policies and procedures;
questions related to disclosure of information and noti-
fication of recipients, including who should be involved
in this process and how it should be done. Respon-
dents were also asked for any suggestions they might
have on improving the process (see Additional File 1:
Appendix 1).
Interviews were conducted over a four month period
from May to August 2006, either in person or by tele-
phone. The interviews were conducted by two of the
research team members (EA and BMcC). To maximise
consistency of questioning, a semi-structured interview
guide was followed in each of the interviews. The
questions were open-ended and interviews lasted
between 45 minutes to 1 hour. All interviews were
audio-taped and then fully transcribed. The transcrip-
tions were checked for accuracy against the tape-
recordings and then imported into NVivo 7, a qualita-
tive data management software program commonly
used in qualitative research [41].
A team analysis approach was employed whereby as
transcripts became available, they were read indepen-
dently by several members of the research team (EA,
BMcC, and JE). The team then met at regular intervals
to discuss the content of interviews and to identify the
themes and issues emerging from the data. A schematic
for coding the data (identifying discrete passages of text
that contain the same idea) was developed by EA and
BMcC and then this coding scheme was applied to a
new batch of interviews by EA, BMcC and JE. Inter-
rater agreement was then calculated and was found to
be very high (100% for major codes and 94.3% for
minor codes) thus indicating that the coding scheme
was working well. This schematic was then used to code
t h ee n t i r ed a t as e tb yB M c C ,s ot h a ta l li n t e r v i e w sw e r e
coded using the same coding themes. This schematic
acted as a taxonomy, classifying and organizing the
complexity of the 45 responses and there is a close
parallel between the taxonomy (reported in [38]) and
the interview guide. Further, deeper coding of the data
generated other propositions, which may be seen as sec-
ond order constructs (see [42-44]). The analytical devel-
opment of these constructs allowed relationships to be
identified between the codes in the taxonomy (see [45]).
These also emerged because of our interest in blood
risk management. Thus the issues of notification,
response to minimal risk, responsibility and legal
requirement are transformed into those appearing in the
results section, guided by themes and theories of risk
management and expert judgement outlined above, i.e.
the heuristics and logics used to deal with uncertainty
and to manage risk for protective, liability and precau-
tionary reasons. In presenting the findings we have
selected quotes that illustrate these ideas, allowing as
many respondents as possible to speak. We suggest,
therefore, that our paper makes a methodological con-
tribution by using the typifications of social phenomen-
ology to transform respondents’ concerns into specific
risk discourses.
Results
Uncertainty as risk: What do we call what just happened?
As a foreshadowing to outline different conceptions of
how blood product risk should be managed, we note
confusion among respondents over the meaning of the
terms ‘recall’ and ‘withdrawal’.T h e r ei sm e a n tt ob e
clarity in:
Recall
“With respect to a health product, other than a medical
device, means a responsible party’s removal from further
distribution or use, or correction, of a distributed pro-
duct that presents a risk to the health of customers or
violates legislation administered by Health Products and
Food Branch Inspectorate (HPFBI)” [46].
Withdrawal
“The removal from further distribution or use, or cor-
rection of a distributed product where there is no health
and safety risk and no contravention of the legislation
administered by the HPFBI. It is not considered to be a
recall” [46].
Yet only 14/45 (30%) of individuals interviewed indi-
cated that they knew the difference between the two
terms. The difference between the terms is confusing
for both hospital and blood supplier personnel:
“I think they are confusing. The only reason, I’ll be
honest; the only reason that I’m familiar with it is
because of the incident that we went through ...”
(Laboratory Manager-01)
“Well ... it’s very confusing. We are not exactly sure
when they recall something or withdraw something.
It’s, you never know why they are asking you to
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information, and it is somewhat frustrating, because
you know why are they doing this?” (Lab Technolo-
gist-06)
“Um... gosh... there probably is a very important dif-
ference and I ... I would be lying to you if I said with
confidence that I could tell you the difference” (Physi-
cian using blood products-01)
The confusion is mainly associated with diagnosis (what
is it?) and does not appear to influence the action (what is
to be done?) taken to deal with the recall or withdrawal
notification at the hospital level. Regardless of whether a
recall or withdrawal is issued, the initial action taken by
the hospital Transfusion Service is the same: implicated
products are removed from useable inventory. So would
uncertainty be removed if one term was applied?
“I don’t think they should be handled differently. You
know if for whatever reason a product is being taken
o f ft h em a r k e t ,i tw o u l d ,i t ’s unfortunate that you
have two terms where again they have different con-
notations. I think one term should suffice for all
and... they should be handled in the same way.”
(Physician Blood Bank-03)
“Well I guess the fact that we have so much trouble
remembering which is which... could be problematic.
I think for the regulator they do require. I mean it’s
important to have two different terms... with two
different definitions because they, they are two dif-
ferent matters. In practice that we get the two terms
mixed up, I’m not sure it really matters...” (Blood
Supplier-07)
Managing the risk - three conceptions of risk
While there were differences in labelling what was hap-
pening, there were none in terms of prognosis (likely
outcome), seen universally as the removal of unsafe pro-
duct. In other words, expert opinion converges with
respect to the goal - safe blood - but on how and why
this might be done there is divergence, thus revealing
differences in management perspectives. We identify
three approaches to managing the risk from this organi-
sational threat: risk as hazard, risk as liability and risk
and precaution.
Risk as hazard emphasises the potential adverse conse-
quences to patient well-being. Such an approach
demands immediate removal and the full disclosure of
what is happening to patients. Furthermore, it suggests
that those notifying patients should be as close to the
patients as possible, usually the treating or transfusing
physician. This risk is almost a given and most
comments refer to the importance of physician notifica-
tion to allay any or all fears about hazard, the physician
being seen as trusted, knowledgeable and close to the
patient. There is agreement on who is central in this
immediate task of ensuring blood safety, the blood sup-
plier, but different stakeholders hold the risk as hazard
view for different reasons. The blood supplier itself sees
a distinctive chain of responsibility and action if blood
may be unsafe - from themselves to the physician to the
patient.
“... you know we are in this era of informing the
patient, but I think to some extent the pendulum can
go too far ... and that we need to be careful about
not giving patients information that’s no of value... I
think we can overdo some of the informing of
patients, it’sa l m o s tl i k ew e ’re passing the buck and
not kind of letting the responsibility stop somewhere
along the way with a physician...” (Blood Supplier-
07)
This discussion on the need to notify seems supported
by all stakeholders. Hospitals see that any notification
from the blood supplier highlights a concern and the
need for action.
“Now, I would anticipate that if the blood... sup-
plier... was concerned enough to notify us as an orga-
nization to recall a product, then the degree of risk is
always such that it would be important for us to
notify the patient. You know what I mean. Like, the
risk assessment has already taken place at the blood
supplier” (Hospital-Risk Management-02)
“I guess from my perspective there is either risk or
there is no risk, and if there’s no risk they’re not noti-
fying us. If they’re notifying us it’s because there is
risk“ (Hospital-PR-01)
Physicians tend to agree but see themselves and are
seen as those best positioned to make patients aware of
potential problems as ‘they know’ their patients best.
“In my opinion, it’s the role of the clinician who’s
caring for the patient to manage those things” (Physi-
cian using blood products-05)
“It’s useful to have a well-informed recommendation
from the Blood Supplier but the hospital always has
to use its discretion and the difference there is that
we know our patient population” (Physician using
blood products-07)
“I think ultimately the physician always has that, you
know, discretion. And that’s clear in case law” (Blood
Supplier-04).
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skills necessary to manage risk as hazard, especially if
their style is based on a confident, medical approach to
the issue.
“So I would be perfectly supportive, of a hospital sys-
t e mo rp r o v i n c i a ls y s t e mo re v e nan a t i o n - w i d es y s -
tem that developed advisory guidelines. But I don’t
think it’s a situation where if it is ... that a physician
doesn’t want to notify her patients that, that some-
how some other agency needs to get involved and
compel that notification” (Physician- Blood Bank-03)
“Id o n ’t know whether there would be a place for a
third party to come in, where a third party would
contact the recipient and say ‘I know that your physi-
cian spoke with you, or that you received a letter, this
is just a reminder that you might need to go for
further testing’” (Laboratory Technician-04)
“Well I don’t know if everybody has them but a
patient representative would be one option. I think
somebody with those sets of skills. Like not just the
technical skills but the people with counselling skills
and discussion. I mean they’d have to have some
kind of knowledge about blood and risk“ (Provincial
Health Ministry-02)
Risk as hazard was the best articulated of the discourses
on how to manage. Yet risk as liability, where the potential
consequences for system integrity of specific practices
were central, received greater expression from respon-
dents. Patient well-being is of course still vital but now dis-
closure to patients of events that might affect their well-
being protects the blood supply institution as well. Such
management is seen particularly at the supplier and hospi-
tal levels. The identification of the risk and its disclosure
were closely related. But under many comments lies an
often implicitly stated concern over liability, i.e. what is
our liability if we do not act (disclose) and something hap-
pens? In other words, their responses are anchored around
current operational characteristics of the healthcare sys-
tem and their legally demarcated roles within that system.
Liability is often framed in terms of outside percep-
tions, specifically and not unusually, on how public per-
ceptions of expertise and expert response may be
framed. In this discourse, the role of the blood supplier
is central but responses to their notices may vary
depending on how others see the issue and their liabi-
lity. The blood supplier must always give an opinion.
“We [Blood Supplier] would always give our opinion
as to follow up.” (Blood Supplier-01)
The importance of local circumstances and their pos-
sible impact on liability are recognised by the blood
supplier. It must balance its obligations with that of the
independence (and discretionary action) of institutions
such as hospitals and doctors.
“What we do in our centre is... we take a look at the
reason for the recall, we may provide that informa-
tion. The hospital doesn’td om u c hw i t hi t ,a n dt h e y
know they’ll get a supplementary letter from me if I
think recipient notification is required so that deci-
sion whether recipient notification is required is
made here. I think that ... works better in our envir-
onment because I have more experience in this than
the regional lab tech ... and we don’th a v ee x p e r i -
enced blood bank directors in most of the blood
banks.” (Blood Supplier-02)
Yet circumstances at the local level may affect
response to this opinion.
“But the Blood Supplier has their own ideas about
what, in what situations do recipients need to be
notified so they advise us. In our opinion, you do or
do not have to notify the recipient if this product has
been transfused already and we sometimes do what
the Blood Supplier asks, although we’re a little more
aggressive about notifying patients than what the
Blood Supplier does.” (Physician using blood pro-
ducts-01).
“I think you know, some hospitals are in a position
where they absolutely must rely on the expertise of
the Blood Supplier. I mean, they, you know, primary
care hospitals that I assume are somewhat more
comfortable just saying, ‘Look, just tell us what you
want to do. Tell us what you want to say and we’re
not gonna do any independent analysis. Just, you
know, provide us with what your recommendation is.’
Other hospitals are saying, ‘okay Blood Supplier,
thanks for the information. We’re gonna consider this
independently. We have the expertise to do so, you
know. The only thing we want you to do is provide
as much information as you can on the risk and
we’re all consider it at our Transfusion Committee
and we’ll all decide ultimately what we think our
physicians should do in terms of patient notification.’
... that kind of thing. You know, so there’s quite a dif-
ference. So that is a part that we’re struggling with a
little bit in terms of how do we fulfill our obligations?
W en e v e rw a n tt ob e ,w en e v e rw a n tt of e t t e ra n y -
one’s discretion in terms of notification. That’sf o r
s u r e .T h o u g hp a r to fu si ss a y i n g ,y o uk n o w ,p a r to f
the time we think, okay, we can provide all of the, all
of the information, all of the risk information as
clearly as we can, and that’s it and then the hospital
can sort of make their decisions. But there’s another
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position of... we don’t want to abdicate our responsi-
bility and thrust the decision making on hospitals,
you know, so there’s sort of a tension there between
those two” (Blood Supplier-04).
The hospital is perhaps in a position of having to
respond to local pressures before the full facts are
known because they are local institutions and have
explicit liability concerns.
“I believe in full disclosure even if all you can say is
here’s what we think happened, here’s why it hap-
pened, here’s what we know and don’t know, and
here’s a mechanism for either monitoring or what
have you down the road. So in the absence of that, in
the event that there’s some new novel research finding
in the not so distant future, I’ve never been told about
this, I didn’t know I had exposure, some marvellous
new technology or technique comes along that would
perhaps allow me to be more definitive. Well I don’t
even know about it to pursue that or include it in my
own medical history” (Hospital Adminstrator-02)
W h i l es o m eg r o u p sw h i c ha r ec l o s e s tt ot h ep a t i e n t
that is being transfused with blood see most recalls as
leading to minimal risk, perhaps displaying an overconfi-
dence in the role of scientific assessment, others are
concerned about outside perceptions and what these
might do to the situation.
“ ... we couldn’t identify what the risks were and the
risks were minimal, therefore we should not disclose,
and [the Chief of Governance] was adamant that we
needed to ... I was really surprised that the recom-
mendation by the Transfusion Committee was totally
disregarded” (Transfusion Safety Officer-01)
Waiting for an assessment can lead to much time
thinking through the issue. This may result in an affect
response, especially with respect to the media. This may
be exacerbated by public attention being roused before
a system-based announcement can be made.
“And sometimes we’ve got no, we don’th a v ea n
assessment yet... so we’re sitting ... waiting, you know
and there’s a time delay there so... my biggest fear is
in the meantime it hits the media, now we’ve got an
issue” (Laboratory Manager-03)
“But the problem is, is that you have media that’s
watching, and so then, then there’s a different spin
put on this when it hits the newspaper. You know...
another bloody scandal. So are you more concerned
about your public relations or are you more
concerned about the effect you’re going to have on
patient care?” (Laboratory Manager-01)
Much of the liability discourse takes into account the
perceptions and roles of other stakeholders, both inside
and outside the blood supply system. The third dis-
course - risk as precaution - does that too but also
seems to treat problems on a case-by-case basis as
uncertainty cannot be fully removed or explained. It is a
view of risk often held and articulated by system admin-
istrators. A precautionary approach has been based on a
changed perspective toward patients and institutional/
professional partners. And precaution - taking care - is
necessary as interests and ways to achieve them may be
dissimilar. The blood supplier sees precaution as neces-
sary because of these dissimilarities.
“I don’t know how much a hospital’s disclosure policy
would vary from one hospital to another. I mean one
would hope that there’s some uniformity in that or
else disclosure of things is going to be a problem for
very much more than recalls and withdrawals
because I think there’s all kind of things in a hospital
that one might decided you disclose or you don’td i s -
close” (Blood Supplier-07)
“I’mn o tl o o k i n ga ti ti nt h ec a p a c i t yo fd i s c l o s u r e
and our disclosure policy and for us it’s not as simple
as just telling people something went wrong. We have
to ... weigh out what the risk of telling someone versus
the benefit of telling someone ... we very much are
very strong proponents of disclosure and do it unless
the risk of advising is significantly worse than not we
certainly learn towards advising patients” (Hospital
Administrator-03)
Furthermore, the blood supplier argues for precaution
because of the need to respect the different needs and
sensibilities of different types of patient.
“Because right now, the decision whether to inform a
patient is based upon the doctors and the doctors in
hospitals alone. The patient has no input whatso-
ever.... now the CJD thing was a perfect example of
some people probably didn’tw a n tt ok n o wa l lt h e
recalls, because what good could this have done. But
some people did. So that there has to be a choice
made by the patients... and my view and most
patients’ view on that is that they have no business
making that decision for patients. Now, it’s just the
whole attitude of the health system, it’sn o ta n y o n e ’s
particular fault, but it’s just the attitude of you
know, it’s your responsibility and we’ll make the deci-
sion. I think patients feel you know a little ticked
with that” (Transfusion Recipient-02)
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the recipients of the transfused products.
“We only have part of the story when we do these
recalls and withdrawals which is the information
from our end about the donor or about the compo-
nent but we don’t know anything about the recipient
at the other end. And the importance of the informa-
tion and about what should be done has to be deter-
m i n e di nt h ec o n t e x to ft h er e c i p i e n t ” (Blood
Supplier-03)
“I know our medical staff has a problem with the
word recommendation because, I think it centres
around the fact that they are dealing with facts
about the unit and have no facts about the patient.
Certainly, if you go to the level of individual
patients, you can, I think justify different actions
because of the different situations of patients” (Blood
Supplier-01)
Precaution on the part of local system administrators
is weighed not only with respect to hazard but also
institutional and patient autonomy.
“For us it’s not as simple as just telling people that
something went wrong. We have to, we like to, weigh
out what the risk of telling someone versus the benefit
of telling someone ... so I think there needs to be a
way to bring hospitals together and recognising the
hospitals are independent and are free to make their
own choices to the extent that that can be coordi-
nated goes a long way because ... we have to have a
plan B that while we didn’t think disclosure was
appropriate, in the event that another hospital chose
to disclose, we had to be prepared for how we would
respond to that” (Hospital Adminstrator-03)
“It’s a very paternalistic approach to say ‘oh well we
know it’s bad for you and so you know we want to
spare you the pain of having to you now think about
things like this so just let us do it.’ That has not
worked well in the past and we are a sort of newer
generation of people where the attitude has changed...
So, give the sort of transition in the social more that
is out there.... I think trying to take that paternalistic
approach that we will hide things from you for your
own best interest it just won’t sell” (Transfusion Reci-
pient-01)
Discussion
In managing the possible consequences of this error, a
quite minor, almost theoretical, risk to the safety of the
blood supply, there was uncertainty about what was
being managed - a recall or withdrawal. This has now
been resolved in part through the authors’ report (see
[38]). The term recall is now used. Clarity in identifying
responses to a possible hazard is necessary. But the then
uncertainty around terminology did not stop the pro-
blem from being tackled but it caused pause for
thought. We note too in this intensely regulated, safety-
first environment that conventional risk discourse - as
hazard - and management as its removal or mitigation
did not loom large. It is a given in this tightly knit and
collegial community that patient safety is paramount.
There appears to be significant levels of trust between
the different groups of professionals, something not
always found in hazard management settings (see [47]).
This trust and respect provide an excellent basis for
existing and enhanced communication about blood
hazards in these groups. Communication between par-
ties with respect to the issue, what it means, and what
responses are possible is key. It remains important to
remember that there may be differences in approach to,
say, discourse, or treatment and some adjustments may
be required. And while the discourses are ones of
engagement in this case, that does not necessarily mean
that there will not be adversarial interactions over pre-
ferred management strategies and rationales, especially
in the importance given to patient notification. (See [48]
for a discussion of expertise and collaboration). This
need for disclosure may in fact lead to a further risk
management challenge. In our case, there was discussion
among risk managers about risk amplification through
disclosure. Research [49] has certainly shown the impor-
tance of the physician communicating risk issues to the
public.
Risk as liability views system integrity and mainte-
nance as an important goal. Management entails not
only the use of knowledge about patient safety and sys-
tem practice but also a cognitive and emotional commit-
ment to the aims and goals of the organisation. The
supplier agency has created that commitment and loy-
alty within a changing Canadian health care system (see
[37]). Yet uncertainty remains and this may be due to
the centrality of precautionary principles in the blood
supply system. Thus, it is not surprising that risk and
precaution are seen simultaneously as two dimensions
of hazard management. Good record keeping and moni-
toring of transfused blood (and its recipients) enables
precaution to be central in risk management. Kaplan et
al [50] advocate a medical event reporting system for
transfusion and we concur with their suggestions. Such
a system (Transfusion Error Surveillance System -
TESS) is currently being developed and piloted in
Canada [9]. Furthermore, the difference discourses in
expert groups within the same decision-making system
(but likely at different levels of decision-making) may be
beneficial, if recognised as such. ‘Hazard’ is a safety-first
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challenges of risk amplification and perceived injury
may be dealt with if an unknown risk is disclosed and
‘precaution’ ensures due diligence and quality assurance
before action is taken.
With respect to the three risk discourses, some are
more likely to be articulated by some professional
groups - hazard by physicians, liability by administrators
(hospital and blood supplier), precaution by administra-
tors (especially the blood supplier). Those groups are
largely responsible for managing the risk from these
respective vantage points. There is largely a coherence
of expertise within those realms, although it is in part
challenged by laboratory technicians (hazard and liabi-
lity) and transfusion recipients (liability and precaution).
A vital strategy in managing any risk or consequences of
error is a coherent response. This coherence may break
down as different dimensions of risk management are
required (patient safety, system maintenance) or differ-
ent professional and lay groups engaged. In fact, it is
possible for different discourses to be used by one or
more different groups. In all discourses, it is possible for
different heuristics to guide management response, over-
confidence with respect to medical expertise and the
scientific assessment of risk (physicians and blood sup-
plier), anchoring to the legal and formal positions of
institutions (hospitals), and affect with respect to feel-
ings about uncoordinated public announcement of a
risk and perceived media response (laboratory techni-
cians and transfusion staff). The blood supplier uses all
discourses because of its variable role in supplying safe
products.
Conclusions
In adopting a quasi-foundational approach, there are
ways to ensure rigour and the trustworthiness of inter-
pretations. The social phenomenology of Schutz, used to
derive themes and as a basis for theory development
from respondent perceptions, requires meeting three
postulates, namely logical consistency, subjective inter-
pretation and adequacy. For the first, we have high-
lighted how the research problem and methods were
derived from a real world problem on which was based
the questionnaire, sampling strategy and the need to
interview; for the second, by using respondents’ views to
develop interpretation (different than most studies as
the first order or naturalistic constructs are expert
ones); and for the third, by linking second order
constructs to activities and phenomena in blood risk
management. Furthermore, trustworthiness can be
demonstrated by credibility and confirmability (see
[51,52] for practice-based examples). We have provided
a trail from problem identification, questionnaire devel-
opment, coding taxonomies to themes and theoretical
development. We have also provided the rationale of
respondent selection and sampling design as well as an
outline of procedures followed to arrive at constructs or
themes. We have derived through these themes risk dis-
courses and logics relevant to blood risk management.
Before finalization, the study results and recommenda-
tions were presented at a consensus conference of study
participants and stakeholders, to ensure validity of data
interpretation. All suggestions made were incorporated
into the final results. Although we recognize that all
researchers will not necessarily agree to the ways we
have sought validity for these findings (see [53]), first
author conversations with risk managers point to the
utility of the interpretations. Thus this qualitative inves-
tigation has contributed a nuanced risk characterization.
In fact, all discourses are necessary to manage this
low-level risk. This coherence and differentiation of
expertise around managing blood risk has practical con-
sequences. As Hunt [54] notes, governance of risk is
characterised by risk avoidance rather than risk manage-
ment and is in turn dominated by a preoccupation with
safety. The further corollary is the expanding panoply of
regulation and guidelines. This may be noted in blood
supply. And when ‘something happens’–at h r e a tt o
safety–the virtuous cycle of risk,r e g u l a t i o n ,a n dp r e -
scription is interrupted. The relentless pressure for the
systemisation and integration of risk management prac-
tices continues as a watchword for corporate social
responsibility (see [55]). This virtuous cycle is reinforced
by the use of a precautionary logic. As Haggerty [14],
notes, precaution emphasises the worst eventualities. It
i sn o ts om u c ha b o u tr i s k .I t“invites one to anticipate
what one does not yet know, to take into account data,
hypothesis and simple suspicions” [56:288]. With a pro-
duct as vital and special as transfused blood, precaution
is necessary. But societally it may feed anxieties and
increase risk aversion. Practically, we point to considera-
tion being given to enterprise risk management (ERM),
recently developed as ISO 31000 (see [57]) and accepted
by the Canadian Standards Association in 2010.. ERM
considers any risks or uncertainties affecting objectives,
requires a flexible organization to tailor risk manage-
ment, formalising monitoring review and consultation,
and demands accountability from all those dealing with
the risk. All senior managers must be committed to the
process which must be used by all decision-makers in a
flexible organizational structure. In its stages, it consid-
ers risk in careful ways. In setting the context and iden-
tifying risk, it suggests consideration of risk appetite and
triggers. In analyzing and treating risk, ERM points
towards acceptance, control and mitigation. It suggests
ensuring that residual risk and its potential impacts are
not ignored as it is not possible to remove all uncer-
tainty. ISO 31000 may be complemented by using a
Eyles et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:666
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/666
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all evidence to ensure the system is safe to operate (see
[58], potentially modified to permit inputs from all
appropriate stakeholders to organize heterogeneous
information and concerns to ensure the safety and
dependability of a larger network (i.e. the blood system).
Elements of the blood management system have been
drawn to ISO 31000. Furthermore, processes such as
recording, inter-professional communication, notifica-
tion and disclosure have been applied in dealing with
blood risk. Risk triggers and residual risk point to the
relevance of hazard and liability discourses, especially as
in other domains, use of the precautionary principle has
been shown to trigger concerns and lower trust in gov-
ernance structures (see [59]). So for the institution of
precaution we must be clear on what we are managing,
why and in what ways. For the Canadian blood system,
a new procedure of providing reasons for recall will
assist hospitals and other donation agents in managing
perceived risks. Yet the role of expert biases and domain
i n t e r e s t sa r el i k e l yt oc o n t i n u et oe x i s t ,a n dm u s tb e
understood and incorporated to ensure blood safety and
continued public trust and to provide timely responsive-
ness in such a high reliability system. We suggest the
framework of ISO 31000 emphasising context, risk iden-
tification and assessment, risk treatment, communica-
tions and consultation is useful, along with a safety-case
approach. Communication about ways to protect public
safety is always necessary and this must include clarity
on definitions, responsibilities, and public perceptions
and what the consequences of even minor errors mean
in a complex system. Furthermore, error as a risk state
needs careful theorizing and application in systematic
risk management approaches.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Appendix 1: Interview guide for understanding
the management of blood products in Ontario. Appendix provides
the questionnaire used to explore risk management of blood products
under conditions of uncertainty.
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